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
 Introduction
Over the recent decades, labor market researchers have noticed two trends
which, if taken together, pose a challenge to conventional theorizing: Wage
dispersion grew significantly, and over-qualification increased as well. I
do not want to review these findings here, nor discuss the endemic data
problems. My intention is to just stipulate these trends and focus on the
implied theoretical issue.
While the joint occurrence of widening skill margins and overqualification
does not fit well into the standard framework of wage competition, it flows
rather naturally from a more institutional view of labor market processes,
which builds on Melvin R’s() analysis and will termed “Reder
competition.” This is closely related to some efficiency wage arguments
dealing with the joint occurrence of overqualification and inequality such
as that propoposed by S () which builds on discipline efficiency
wages.
The paper is organized as follows: Section  reviews some empirical find-
ings concerning wage inequality and overqualification. Section  introduces
the concept of Reder competition. The subsequent Sections  to  present a
very simple model of Reder competition with the purpose to illustrate the
concept. The model is used in the remaining Sections  to  explain the
joint occurrence of wage dispersion and overqualification in terms of factors
such as labor heterogeneity, skill latitude, labor mobility, and non-labor
costs.
 Wage Dispersion and Over-Qualification
The increase in wage dispersion is illustrated, both for the US and Germany,
in Figures  and , and the increase in overqualification in Figures  and .
It is to be noted that the both trends materialized simultaneously in a
period when educational systems expanded considerably, entailing a better
skilled workforce. With unchanging labor demand, standard theory would
 I use the term “Reder competition” for lack of a better label. In view if S’s () Law
of Eponymy ("No scientific discovery is named after its original discoverer" ), a non-eponymic
label would be preferable, but maybe this is a case where Stigler’s Law is refuted.

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Figure : Wage dispersion in the US -. (Data from N-
 (, )).
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Figure : Wage dispersion in Germany -. (Source: IAB,
preliminary).
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Figure : Overqualification in the US. (Data from V ())
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Figure : Overqualification male,  (left column of each pair) and
/ (right column of each pair) for different skill and age groups.
(I: basic qualification, II: professional qualification, III: university
qualification. Data from L ()).

have predicted wage inequality to diminish rather than increase. To fill
the gap, “skill biased technical change” has been invoked. In the words of
A (, ): “The recent consensus is that technical change favors
more skilled workers, replaces tasks previously performed by the unskilled,
and exacerbates inequality.” This explanation in terms of increasing scarcity
of advanced skills is not easily to reconcile, however, with “evidence that a
substantial—and growing—number of American workers are overqualified
for their jobs,” and that while “ in  one in four workers thought that
they could be replaced by less qualified workers, twenty years later one in
three workers held that opinion.” Seen from a conventional perspective,
this would suggest an increasing oversupply, rather than a shortage of skills.
Another interpretation is possible, however, and will be outlined in the
following sections.
 Reder Competition
We consider labor markets that are characterized by the joint occurrence of
the following features:
• Workers are heterogeneous.
• Workers are imperfectly mobile.
• Jobs exhibit skill latitude
• Firms pay job-specific wages.
• There is wage compression.
Workers are heterogeneous because they differ in many economically relevant
attributes, like experience, trainability, skill, work attitudes, and preferences.
If labor were homogeneous and previous work experience did not matter,
any worker could easily be replaced by another one, and labor markets
 V (, ) and L (, , my translation), respectively.  Some researchers,
such as G et al. () find no significantly rising trend in over-qualification, in spite
of education inflation, yet with increasing shortage of advanced skills, the conventional view
would suggest a declining trend in overqualification.

would be akin to spot markets, with firms hiring the services of workers
for some days just as needed, rather than for prolonged periods, which is
characteristic for modern labor markets. Without heterogeneity, we would
observe neither long-term contracts, nor any screening of applicants, nor
training, and perhaps not even firms as we know them. In contrast, modern
labor markets are characterized by heterogeneity of labor.
Further, workers are imperfectly mobile because they cannot move cost-
lessly from one location to another. With perfect mobility, perfect sorting
of workers would be conceivable, even in presence of labor heterogene-
ity, but this is not what we observe. Because there is imperfect mobility,
heterogeneity is economically important.
We shall assume also that the jobs under discussion exhibit skill latitude
in the sense that the productivity of a job depends on the skill of the worker
doing this job, rather than being independent of the worker’s performance
as long as some minimum skill requirements are met. A job on a production
line would exhibit little latitude, while a sales representative would enjoy
much job latitude in the sense that different workers may work in such a
job with quite different success. If there is skill latitude, labor heterogeneity
matters, as different workers can do the same job, but cannot do it equally
well.
Job-specific wages refer to wages that are fixed according to a wage-setting
policy, rather than by individual bargaining. Examples for job-specific pay
would be a pure time rate paid to all workers performing a certain job, or a
piece rate, or an incentive system like the Taylor plan, Halsey - plan, or
seniority pay.
Wage compression refers to the empirical regularity that firms, given their
wage policies, prefer better workers of poorer workers for any given job. This
 Differences in trainability of new workers in absence of skill latitude would serve the same
purpose. This would correspond to T’s () idea that productivity rests in the jobs
rather than in the workers, and that workers differ in “background characteristics” that affect
training costs.  For actual wage-setting practices, see any textbook on compensation, such
as M and N ().

implies that more productive workers are relatively underpaid, compared to
less productive workers who do the same job.
With labor heterogeneity and skill latitude, the same job can be performed
by workers with different ability, albeit with different perfection, and any
worker meeting some minimum requirements is, in principle, employable.
Firms very obviously distinguish between “good” and “bad” employees. This
is a clear indication that labor heterogeneity and skill latitude are actually
encountered in most firms.
When looking for workers, firms face a heterogeneous labor supply. They
prefer the best applicants and thus face a trade-off between the wage they
offer and the quality of workers they can hire: The better the wage offer,
the more applicants will be available, and the more demanding can be
the hiring standard implemented, entailing a more productive work force.
The wage rate and the hiring standard must be conceived as determined
simultaneously by the firms’ optimizing against the trade-off between the
wage level and the hiring standard.
In other to fix ideas, we may conceive two extreme forms of labor market
clearing:
• Wage competition: For a given hiring standard, the market may be
cleared by adjusting the wage rate
 F and L (, ) find that “only  percent of differences in starting
productivity are reflected in differences in starting wages,” and that “productivity growth of
 percent results in wage growth of only . per cent. See also F (), B (),
and B (, ). Further, the studies by Bishop and by Franzis and Loewenstein are
merely concerned with the relationship between wages and “productivity” in a quite narrow
sense: Employers have rated workers on a “productivity scale of zero to one hundred, where
one hundred equals the maximum productivity any of your employees can attain and zero is
absolutely no productivity.” Wage compression, in their sense, refers to the wage ratios being
below the productivity ratios, determined this way. Even if the authors would have found that
there is no wage compression in their sense, there would be very substantial wage compression
in the Marshallian sense, which is the relevant sense in our context. M (, vi.iii.)
pointed this out as follows: “The corrected law then stands that the tendency of economic
freedom and enterprise is generally to equalize efficiency-earnings in the same district: but
where much expensive fixed capital is used, it would be to the advantage of the employer to raise
the time-earnings of the more efficient workers more than in proportion to their efficiency.”
Wage compression is used here as an assumption in order to simplify and shorten the argument.
In the class of models underlying the present analysis, wage compression is obtained as result
of competition if firms offer performance pay.

• Job competition: For a given wage rate, the labormarket may be cleared
by adjusting the hiring standard.
The view of wage competition–viz. treating labor markets in analogy to
product markets–dominates contemporary labor market analysis. The other
extreme, job competition, has been used by a minority of labor economists,
following Lester T (). Both views are incomplete. Labor markets
characterized by skill latitude are best analyzed in terms of a combination of
both extremes: Wages offers and hiring standards are determined simulta-
neously in response to market conditions. This is the type of labor market
competition R () has envisaged, and will be labeled accordingly:
• Reder competition: Labor markets are cleared by simultaneous adjust-
ments of wages and hiring standards (and possibly other parameters).
Reder competition can not usefully be analyzed, however, by simply com-
bining the views of wage competition and job competition, viz. by first
treating the hiring standard as given and analyze wage formation, and than
take wages given and consider the adjustment of hiring standards, because
such a ceteris paribus treatment would fade out the interdependence of both
mechanisms. The following analysis focuses on the interdependence of
hiring standards and wage setting.
 Selection Wages
Labor heterogeneity in conjunction with skill latitude involves workers who
can perform a given job with different productivity while their pay does
not reflect productivity differentials fully. This setting induces firms to offer
wages in order to control the productivity of their work force. The market
wages that arise from the interaction of firms engaging in this kind of wage
 More specifically: As wage determination and the determination of hiring standards respond
to the same set of market forces, it is not useful to fix one or the other under a ceteris-paribus
clause, as is done in analyses emphasizing wage competition while assuming given skill demands,
or emphasizing job competition while fixing wages. (See S (, Ch. ) for a pertinent
methodological discussion.)

setting are termed “selection wages.” This section illustrates this idea in a
simple case.
To capture labor heterogeneity and skill latitude, we consider just two
grades of labor, prolific andmediocre. Both types of workers, the mediocre
and the prolific, can perform the task under consideration, but with dif-
ferent efficiency: The prolific workers are more productive. Firms can
distinguish the types costlessly when they hire them. Further we assume that
the alternative employment for both types of workers is such that individual
productivity differences do not matter—think of a conveyor belt. Their
wage in this standardized employment functions as a reservation wage for
the labor market under consideration. It is denoted by R.
To capture wage compression, we assume that firms pay the same wage to
mediocre and prolific workers.
While firms prefer to employ only prolific workers, not enough of them
are available to produce the output demanded. Hence firms have to hire also
mediocre workers. Firms can, however, increase the number of applicants—
and also in particular of prolific applicants—by offering a wage above the
going market rate. This would enable them to increase the share of prolific
workers in their work force and and enjoy higher productivity, but at the
expense of higher labor costs.
We will assume here that all workers performing the job under considera-
tion receive the same wage, regardless of their productivity. This captures, in
the simplest form, the idea that wage differentials do not reflect productivity
differentials fully—they don’t reflect them at all. At the same time, the
assumption captures the empirically relevant case of a wage without a per-
formance component. It can be shown that in the case of performance pay,
wage compression will result and broadly similar results can be obtained,
but the subsequent analysis focuses on the simple case of flat pay.
Consider, thus, an industry composed of a number of identical firms that
operate under free entry and produce a certain good. Firm size is fixed in
 Selection wages are a variety of efficiency wages, see S (, ). They are
closely akin to self-selection wages studied by W (), but do presuppose asymmetry
of information.  This assumption can easily be relaxed in the sense that we may allow
different reservation wages for both types of workers.

the sense that each firm can employ just n workers, regardless of whether
they are mediocre or prolific.
The prolific workers have productivity x, and the mediocre workers have
productivity y < x. Denote by q the fraction of prolific workers and by
the remainder (1− q) the fraction of mediocre workers in the work force.
We shall refer to q as the qualification structure. As firms can assess the
productivity of the applicants, they will hire all prolific workers who apply
and fill the remaining job openings with mediocre applicants.
Given the fraction of prolific workers q in the market with productivity
x and the fraction of mediocre workers (1 − q) with productivity y < x,
average productivity of the work force under consideration is
a = q · x+ (1− q) · y. ()
The average productivity of a firm’s work force may deviate from average
market productivity a if the share of prolific workers in a firm differs from
the market average. Denote the share of prolific workers enjoyed by the firm
under consideration by ρ. The entailed productivity of the firm’s work force
is
α = ρ · x+ (1− ρ) · y
= ρ (x− y) + y. ()
The share of prolific workers in the firm’s workforce ρ will depend in turn
on the wage offer w the firm makes, as compared to the going market wage
rateW . If the firm pays above the market wage (w > W ), it will attract
more prolific applicants and need hire only fewer mediocre workers. If
the firm offers a wage below the market wage (w < W ), it will find fewer
prolific applicants and has to hire more mediocre workers. This idea can be
expressed by
ρ = q ·
(
1 + µ · log
( w
W
))
()
where the constant 1 > µ > 0 parametrizes mobility. It gives the elasticity
 Since there is no continuum of different workers with different productivity, firms cannot
impose a hiring standard in this extremely simple setting, but the fundamental selection wage
mechanism still applies: By increasing the wage offer, firms can attract more prolific workers
and attain a higher productivity of their work force. For an analysis of the continuous case, see
S ().
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Figure : The share ρ of prolific workers in a typical firm as a function
of the wage offer w. If the wage offer is equal to the market wage
(w = W ) , the share of prolific workers in the firm will be equal to
the market share (ρ = q).
of qualification for a typical firm in response to its wage offer:
µ =
∂ρ
∂w
· w
ρ
∣∣∣∣
w=W
.
Equations () and () imply
α = q ·
(
1 + µ · log
( w
W
))
· (x− y) + y. ()
The industry is composed of a number of firms. Each firm has to invest
in establishing a workshop for n workers. The capital outlays induce capital
user costs (including normal profits) of C. With productivity α, a firm’s
 We exclude µ ≥ 1 because it would be always optimal to pay maximum wages in this case,
and the selection effect would not apply in any interesting way. The formulation () is selected
for reasons of simplicity of exposition. A more general formulation such as ρ = q · f
(
w
W
)
with f (1) = 1, f ′ > 0, and f ′′ < 0 would not change the argument or the results.

production will be α · n. For a product price p, sales receipts will be p ·α · n.
With a wage rate w, the firm incurs labor costs w · n. Further, it has to
cover capital user costs C. The firm’s profits will thus be equal to Π =
p · α · n− w · n− C. 
For the subsequent argument it is convenient to express profits of the
typical firm in per-capita terms. Denoting per-capita capital user costs by
c = 1nC, these per-capita profits are given by
pi = p · α− w − c
= p ·
(
q ·
(
1 + µ · log
( w
W
))
· (x− y) + y
)
− w − c. ()
Consider now market equilibrium. As all firms are alike, all firms will
pay the same wage rate w which can be identified with the market wage rate
W. Equilibrium requires two things: First, per-capita profits must be zero.
Otherwise there would be market entry or market exit, changing conditions
of supply and demand. Second, it must be optimal for each firm to set its
wage rate w equal to the market wage rateW . Else the market wage rate
would change.
The zero-profit condition at w =W is equivalent to
p =
W + c
q · (x− y) + y . ()
This condition is depicted as the “zero profit” curve in Figure (a). Above
that curve, there are positive profits that induce market entry and reduce the
price level, below there will be losses and market exit, driving the product
price up. As the minimum market wage is given by the reservation wage
R, the zero profit curve is of relevance only for wages levels exceeding the
reservation wage.
 For simplicity, other non-labor costs are neglected here. This simplification does not affect
the argument nor the results. In order to take outlays for variable inputs into account, interpret
p as the market price of the productminus the outlays for other factors of production per piece.
 If there is market entry, this will not only increase production, but also employment. This
increase comes about through the employment of mediocre workers (as all prolific workers are
already employed). This will reduce q and thereby shift the zero-profit curve up. This effect
would not affect our conclusions but is neglected here in order to keep the argument simple.

1 2 3 4
W
10
20
p
R
(a) zero profit
1 2 3 4
W
10
20
30
p
R
(b) selection wage
Figure : The zero profit curve (a) gives all (W,p)-combinations
where the zero-profit condition () is satisfied. The selection wage
curve (b) gives all (W,p)-combinations where condition () is
met.The parameters used are x = 1, y = .5, q = .5, c = 10,
µ = .5 andR = 1.
The parameters used are x = 1, y = .5, q = .5, c = 10, µ = .5
andR = 1.
The conditions for a profit maximum with respect to w are
∂pi
∂w
= p · q · µ · (x− y) 1
w
− 1 = 0 ()
∂2pi
∂w2
= −p · q · µ · (x− y) 1
w2
< 0. ()
As the second-order condition () is always satisfied, the first-order con-
dition () guarantees a profit maximum (if a maximum exists at all). At
w =W , equation () implies
p =
W
q · µ · (x− y) . ()
We denote this equation as the “selection wage equation.” Its graphical
representation is termed the selection wage curve and is depicted in (b).
The selection wage curve gives, for any wage levelW , that price level that
makes it optimal for the individual firm to set its wage w just equal to to
market wage W . Above this curve, the derivative ∂pi∂w in () is positive at

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Figure : (a) Market equilibrium is obtained where the zero profit
curve and the selection wage curve cross. The phase diagram (b)
indicates stability. (Parameter values as in Figure . Equilibrium is at
W = 2 and p = 16.)
w =W . The typical firm will therefore set its wage above the market wage
(w > W ). This will drive the market wage up. Below this curve, we will
have ∂pi∂w < 0 at w = W , and the typical firm will set w < W . This will
drive the market wage down. 
The crossing of the two curves gives the equilibrium combination of the
wage level and the product price. Algebraically equations () and () can be
solved for the equilibrium market wage rate and the equilibrium price. The
equilibrium wage rate—which will be called the “selection wage”—is
W¯ =
µq (x− y)
q (x− y) (1− µ) + y · c ()
and the corresponding equilibrium price is
p¯ =
c
y + q (x− y) (1− µ) . ()
 The selection wage is a special case of what is known as an S (, ) hast termed
an “efficiency wage.” This modern usage of the term “efficiency wage” refers to the wage rate, set
by the firm, that minimizes the Marshallian efficiency-wage. The selection wage is an efficiency
wage in this sense. In order to avoid confusion, it may be better to avoid the modern term in
speak in the present context of “selection wages.”

The equilibrium will be feasible only, if the equilibrium wage W¯ exceeds the
reservation wageR of the workers. Otherwise the firms have to maximize
their profits () under the additional constraint w ≥ R, and would set w =
R, entailing a market wage levelW = R as would be expected with wage
competition. The case of interest here (and where the wage competition
mechanism is not applicable) relates to the case that the reservation is below
the selection wage. If this is the case, any changes in the reservation wage
would not affect the equilibrium wage (which is the selection wage) and
the equilibrium price level. This an obvious deviation from the results that
would be obtained from a model of wage competition.
 Stability
The phase diagram given in Figure  indicates stability. Another way to
see this is the following. Assume that the prevailing wage levelW initially
differs from the equilibrium wage level W¯ . By combining () and (), we
obtain the profit-maximizing wage level w for the typical firm as
w =
µ (x− y) q
(x− y) q + y (W + c)
which implies together with () and ()
w −W = − (1− µ) (x− y) q + y
(x− y) q + y
(
W − W¯ ) . ()
If the wage level is above the equilibrium wage level (W > W¯ ), each firm
will set its wage w below the market wage levelW . This drives the market
wage level down until the equilibrium wage level is reached. Conversely, for
W < W¯ the firms set w > W . This drives the wage level up to W¯ . This
establishes stability of adjustment. The graph of equation () is depicted in
Figure and the direction of adjustment is indicated.
 A formal analysis would proceed as follows. Denote denote the zero profit curve by
p = a + bW and the selection wage curve by p = c + dW with a > c and b < d.
The differential equation systemp˙ = κ (a+ bW − p) , W˙ = λ
(
p−c
d
−W
)
describes, for
some positive speed parameters κ and λ, the adjustment described in the text. Its Jacobian(
−κ κb
λ
d
−λ
)
has a negative trace and a positive determinant. This establishes stability.

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Figure : If the market wageW is above the equilibrium wage W¯ , the
typical firm will set its wage offerw below the market wageW (point
A). This drives the market wage down. Conversely,W < W¯ induces
w > W , and this drives the market wage up until equilibrium is
reached andw = W = W¯ obtains. (Point B. Parameters as in Figure
.)
Further, the equilibrium would be unstable if the wage rate exceeds the
marginal value product of a mediocre worker. If this were the case it would
not be profitable for any firm to hire a mediocre worker, and leave all jobs
unmanned that cannot be filled with prolific workers. This condition is
p · x > W . Together with () and () it can be equivalently stated as
x >
µq
1− µq or µq <
x
1 + x
. ()
If the productivity x of the mediocre workers is too low, it would not be
worthwhile to employ them. If mobility is high, the equilibrium wage level
W¯ would be high, and mediocre workers were too expensive to employ, and
the same would hold true if the ratio of prolific workers in the work force
were too high.
 Condition () is satisfied for the parameter values given in Figure . This establishes the
possibility of such solutions.

 Increasing Heterogeneity and Latitude
Consider an increase of worker heterogeneity and skill latitude, in the sense
that the productivity differential between prolific and mediocre workers in
ceases while average labor productivity remains constant. We may formalize
this by introducing a heterogeneity parameter h such that an increase in
h increases the difference (x− y) but leaves average productivity qx +
(1− q) y unchanged. If we write the productivities x and y as functions of
h, these functions must satisfy q · x′ (h) + (1− q) · y′ (h) = 0 and we can
stipulate
x′ > 0, y′ = − q
1− q x
′ < 0.
An increase in heterogeneity hmeans that the productivity of the prolific
workers increases and the productivity of the mediocre workers decreases
while average productivity remains unaffected.
As average productivity remains unaffected, the zero-profit constraint ()
is not changed. Yet increasing heterogeneity enlarges the difference (x− y).
This decreases the slope of the selection wage curve. As a consequence, the
equilibrium wage rate and the equilibrium price level increase (Figure ).
The intuition for this result is that the selection wage aspect of wage
setting becomes more important if heterogeneity increases. This induces
firms to raise the wage level. In the aggregate this raises costs and prices.
 Trends in Heterogeneity and Latitude
A closer look at the studies dealing with skill-biased technical change reveal
that skill requirements have changed in all kinds of jobs, not just in the well-
paying jobs. A et al. (, , ) have noted: “The substitution
away from routine and toward nonroutine labor input was not primarily
accounted for by educational upgrading; rather, task shifts are pervasive at all
educational levels.” In a similar vein, S-O (, ) has observed:
“There has been a sharp increase in nonroutine cognitive tasks, such as
doing research, planning, or selling, and a pronounced decline in manual
and cognitive routine tasks, such as doubleentry bookkeeping and machine
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Figure : An increase in heterogeneity reduces the slope of the selec-
tion wage curve while leaving the zero-profit condition unaffected.
As a result, the equilibrium wage level and the equilibrium price level
increase. (Parameters as in Figure , with x increased from 1 to 1.1
and y decreased from .5 to .4. The equilibrium wage level increases
from 2to 3and the equilibrium prince increases from 16to 17.4 .)
feeding. . . . most of the task changes have occurred within occupations.”
This suggests an increase of skill latitude. At the same time, the expansion
of the educational systems has increased the number of educated workers,
and it can be expected that the enlarging of the pool of educated workers
has increased heterogeneity.
By the above argument, the increase in latitude and heterogeneity will
make it more profitable for firms to increase their wage offers in order to
attract the more productive workers. At the market level, this will lead to
higher wages, making education even more attractive. If we assume that
additional education increases the supply both of prolific and of mediocre
workers, we can expect an improving qualification structure to emerge.
Consider how this will affect wage formation.

 Changes in Qualification Structure
Another aspect of wage formation is captured by the proportion q of prolific
workers in the workforce. Consider the effect of an increase in the number of
prolific workers in the work force, viz. an increase in q. Such a change affects
both the zero-profit line () and the selection wage curve (). The zero-profit
line will shift down, because an increase in the number of prolific workers
increases productivity and reduces, for any given wage level, production
costs per unit of output. At the same time, an increase in q will flatten the
selection wage curve which would, by itself, induce a higher wage rate. The
underlying mechanism is that, with an increase in the wage offer, a firm
attracts more applicants. If the fraction of prolific workers amongst these
applicants increases, a wage increase becomes even more effective as an
instrument, as more prolific workers are around than can be attracted this
way.
The joint outcome of both effects can be evaluated by again taking the
appropriate derivatives of equations () and (). We obtain
∂W¯
∂q
= Θ2c (x− y) yµ > 0 ()
∂p¯
∂q
= −Θ2c ((x− y) (1− µ)) < 0 ()
and see that the selection wage effect pushes the wage level up, while the
increased average productivity of labor abates costs and prices, overcompen-
sating the cost increases brought about by the wage increase. Wages go up
and prices go down. With the parameter values of Figure , an increase q
from q = .5 to q = .6 increases the wage rate fromW = 2 toW = 2.3 and
decreases the price from p = 16 to p = 15.4.
 Education and Overqualification
Consider now the case that the jobs under consideration require some
previous training. The higher the wage rateW , the higher will be the supply
of trained workers, both prolific and mediocre. Firms will preferentially

hire the prolific workers and fill the remaining vacancies with mediocre
workers. If more workers train than are needed to fill all vacancies, we have
overqualification.
Workers who consider training will face a lottery: They will turn out
prolific or mediocre, with certain probabilities. If prolific, a worker will be
hired at wageW with certainty, if mediocre only with a certain probability
that decreases with increasing overeducation. With an increasing wage rate
we would thus expect more training. This improves the qualification struc-
ture. The improvement of the qualification structure induces even higher
wages and expanded training, along with increased overqualification. In
this sense, the joint occurrence of increasing wage inequality and overedu-
cation is brought about by Reder competition. The view fits well with the
empirical observation that the increase in inequality seems to have been
caused “predominantly by increasing wage dispersion within industries,
rather than between industries” (W, , ). It fits also well with
the other interpretation that overqualification is brought about by labor
heterogeneity where the less able within an educational group do not find
adequate employment and have to take jobs where their qualification is
partially redundant (G and MI, ). Further, some authors
have observed an increased wage premium from education and took this as
“prima facie evidence against there being any over-investment in education”
(G et al., , ). The above argument shows that such a conclusion
may be doubted, as over-education may indeed be produce increased wage
premia for education.
 Increasing Mobility
The selection wage mechanism that brings about wage dispersion and
overqualification has been described here as propelled by increasing het-
erogeneity and skill latitude. Other processes may produce the same result,
however. To illustrate such amechanism, consider an increase labor mobility.
A conventional preconception would be that increase in the mobility of the
workers—in the sense of a greater responsiveness to wage differentials—will
render the labor market “more competitive,” thereby improving efficiency

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Figure : An increase in mobility reduces the slope of the selection
wage curve while leaving the zero-profit condition unaffected. As
a result, the equilibrium wage level and the equilibrium price level
increase. (Parameters as in Figure , and µ increased from .5 to .7
The equilibrium wage level increases from 2to 3and the equilibrium
prince increases from 16to 17.4 .)
and decreasing production costs. This would lead in turn to reduced prod-
uct prices. As will be seen presently, the outcome in the model discussed so
far amounts to the opposite.
Mobility is parametrized by µ. An increase in µ reduces the slope of the
selection wage equation () in the (W,p) plane but leaves the zero-profit
condition () unchanged. Hence both the wage level and the price level
increase (Figure ).
The intuition for this result is simple: With increased mobility, wage
increases become more effective as a means for attracting prolific workers.
This induces firms to raise their wages. For the industry as a whole, this
increases costs and therefore the price of the product. We obtain wage
increases and price increases in response to an increase in mobility.
 See also S (, ) for a similar argument in the context of turnover wages.

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Figure : An increase in capital intensity raises the zero profit line
while leaving the selection wage line unaffected. As a result, the
equilibrium wage level and the equilibrium price level increase. (Pa-
rameters as in Figure , and c increased from 10 to 14 The equilib-
rium wage level increases from 2to 2.8, and the equilibrium prince
increases from 16 to 22.4 .)
 Fixed Non-Labor Costs
Still another mechanism leading to a similar outcome relates to an increase
in fixed non-labor costs, such as capital costs. An increase such costs can
be captured by an increase in c. This shifts the zero-profit line () down
and leaves the selection wage equation () unaffected. Hence both the
equilibrium wage and the equilibrium price will move up (Figure ).
The intuition is straightforward again: If more capital is used, the product
 . Variable non-labor costs are not relevant for the present argument. They can be easily
introduced into the argument by re-interpreting the product price. Denote bym the variable
costs occurring unit. From the point of view of the firm it is equivalent whether to obtain
a price of p with variable cost of zero, or a price of (p+m) with variable costsm. Hence
substituting p by (p−m) in all previous formulae would suffice to take care of such variable
costs. All our results would therefore be maintained. A change in variable costs would simply
lead to a corresponding change in the product price while leaving the wage level unaffected.

price increases. More productive workers produce more with the same
equipment, and any productivity advantage becomes more valuable. As
a consequence, productivity differentials among workers become more
important to the firm, and the firm will have an incentive to offer higher
wages in order to attract more prolific workers. As all firms behave in
this manner, the wage level is pushed up. The subsequent precess is as
described above for the case of labor heterogeneity: Education becomes
more attractive, and overqualification increases.
 Conclusion
Reder competition emphasizes that firms offer wages to improve the quality
of their work force. If a firm offers a higher wage, it has more applicants to
select from, and will end up with better workers. Thus firms face a trade-off
between wages and productivity. This induces them to set selection wages
that balance the costs and benefits of offering higher wages.
Factors that render differences between workers more important induce
firms to place more emphasis on selection and to increase wages. Such fac-
tors are labor heterogeneity, skill latitude, or labor mobility. All these factors
would give rise to the joint occurrence of inequality and overqualification.
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